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REVIEW OF SAFETY REPORTS INVOLVING ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS 
Divya C. Chandra and Andrew Kendra 
United States Department of Transportation 
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 
Cambridge, MA 
Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) are a relatively new device used by pilots. Even so, 37 safety-
related events involving EFBs were identified from the public online Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS) database as of June 2008. In addition, two accident reports from the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) cite EFB as a contributing factor. Underlying EFB issues 
were ascribed to each ASRS report by the authors based on subject matter expertise. Pilots 
reported issues such as configuration of the chart display and difficulty using the EFB when they 
were newly implemented. Both NTSB reports identified use of an EFB for calculation of landing 
distance as a contributing factor in the accidents. The NTSB reports identify areas for 
improvement in the evaluation of EFB software as well as training and procedures. This report 
provides further recommendations for improving EFB guidance materials to mitigate safety issues. 
The Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) industry has grown rapidly since the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-76A in March of 2003 (FAA, 2003). A recent review of EFB products 
shows the diversity of implementations that are being purchased and deployed by all types of operators (Yeh and 
Chandra, 2007). Their benefits include better access to aircraft operating documents, just-in-time flight performance 
calculations by the flight crew, and reduction of paper charts and documents in the flight deck. For more information 
on what functions EFBs support, see Shamo (2000) and Hirschman (2009). 
The purpose of this report is to examine what, if any, safety impacts EFBs are having as the industry matures 
and units are deployed more widely. To accomplish this task, safety-related reports pertaining to EFBs were 
obtained from the public online Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database managed by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). These reports were analyzed to understand what impact the EFB 
had in the event. In addition, we review two National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports that cite the EFB 
as a contributing factor in aircraft accidents. 
ASRS reports are useful for identifying human factors areas of interest. However, there are limitations to the 
data. In particular, these are subjective self-reports that were submitted voluntarily. The reporters are not trained 
observers and may have difficulty in observing their own situation and performance. Also, the ASRS website states 
that in many cases, the reports have not been corroborated by the FAA or NTSB and therefore the report database 
cannot be used to infer the prevalence of a particular problem within the National Airspace System. 
In this report, we discuss how the EFB-related reports were identified and then describe the overall set of 
reports that were obtained. We present descriptive observations about the data, interpret the safety reports to 
determine what EFB human factors issues were encountered, and summarize the EFB-specific issues from the 
NTSB reports. We conclude with recommendations for improving guidance to mitigate these issues. 
Identifying EFB-Related Safety Reports 
Safety reports were collected from the online ASRS database in June 2008 (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov). The 
NTSB reports were obtained from the online database (http://www.ntsb.gov). Other databases that may contain 
EFB-related safety reports, such as those kept by airlines, are not publicly accessible and were not searched. 
In order to find EFB-related reports in the ASRS database, a key word search was conducted on the full 
narrative and synopsis of the report. This task was complicated because there is no standard terminology in use for 
EFB systems and applications. The following search terms were used to identify the relevant reports: EFB, Onboard 
Performance Computer, Tablet PC, Tablet, Paperless, Electronic Chart, Laptop, and APLC (an abbreviation used at 
one airline for “Airport Performance Laptop Computer”). In order to locate the more recent accident report on the 
NTSB website, the term “Onboard Performance Computer” (OPC) was used. The resulting accident report, from 
2007, references an older report from 2000 in which the EFB is referred to as the APLC. 
Spurious reports were often returned from the ASRS search and these were manually removed from the 
search results. In some cases the unrelated reports were easily identified, such as references to passenger laptops or 
medicinal tablets, but other reports were reviewed carefully to determine whether the EFB was actually a factor in 
407
  
the situation. Cases where the EFB was used normally during incidents that were set in motion by other factors were 
not considered relevant. For example, if a report mentioned that the first officer was using the EFB, then stowed it to 
listen to air traffic control communications, then no problem with the EFB was documented per se, and the case was 
dropped from the set. Other cases were excluded for a variety of reasons. For example, in one case, a Part 91 
operator’s laptop-based moving map display failed to function at a critical time. This case was eventually discarded 
because Part 91 moving map displays are not addressed under AC 120-76A (FAA, 2003) and because this type of 
map display is similar to hand-held or installed GPS displays, which are generally not classified as EFBs. 
Analysis 
Some information was copied directly from the ASRS report into a spreadsheet for analysis, but other 
information was constructed by the authors based on their subject matter expertise. For example, the authors 
classified the outcome or anomaly that occurred and judged whether the EFB was a primary or contributing cause 
for the outcome or anomaly. Table 1 shows what information was copied, extracted, or interpreted about each event. 
Table 1. Information extracted or constructed for each relevant safety report. 
Information Copied Directly  
From ASRS Report 
Information Extracted or Interpreted 
from ASRS Report 
Interpretations of the Event 
Constructed by Authors 
• Case Number 
• Year 
• Operating Regulation (e.g., Part 91) 
• Operator Type (e.g., Corporate) 
• Synopsis 
• Callback Interview 
• Flight Conditions  
(e.g., visual or instrument) 
• Light (e.g., nighttime, daytime) 
• Other Environmental Conditions 
• Aircraft Make/Model 
• Relevant airport 
(e.g., origin, destination) 
• Phase of flight (e.g., arrival, climb) 
• EFB application in use  
(e.g., electronic charts)  
• Outcome/Anomaly  
(e.g., altitude deviation) 
• Interesting quotes 
• Search term(s) used to find the 
report 
• Description of EFBs in use 
(e.g., how many, what type) 
• Summarized the EFB issue 
• Categorized the EFB issue 
• Determined whether the EFB 
was a primary or contributing 
factor to the outcome/anomaly. 
 
In order to identify the outcome or anomaly, the authors tried to determine why the reporter considered the 
event as being serious enough to warrant filing an ASRS report. In general, the answer to this question was the 
“outcome.” The outcomes and anomalies found in the ASRS reports are typically an actual violation or a “near 
violation” (i.e., a violation that almost occurred) of a requirement such as an altitude clearance, or published heading 
for a departure or arrival procedure. Filing a voluntary ASRS report grants the reporter a level of immunity for the 
violation as detailed in Advisory Circular (AC) 00-46D (FAA, 1997). There was only one such outcome/anomaly in 
each of the reports. 
In order to distinguish between primary and contributing factors for the event, we reviewed the reporter’s 
narrative carefully to determine the order of events and the self-reported actions and difficulties. The primary factor 
was the one without which the event was likely not to have occurred at all. Contributing factors tended to complicate 
or exacerbate the situation. In some cases, the narrative clearly identifies what the reporter considered to be the 
primary factor in the event or there was only one factor in the event (e.g., an expired database on the EFB). In most 
cases, however, there was more than one factor and the authors attempted to prioritize the factors. The use of these 
terms, “primary” and “contributing” factors, is consistent with language used in NTSB reports. 
In addition, the description and classification of the EFB issue encountered was based on the authors’ 
judgment. This was the most subjective part of the analysis. In some cases there was enough information to judge 
what the issue was with regard to the EFB (e.g., the reporter mentioned that he/she was unable to read the screen in 
bright sunlight). In other cases there was not enough information to identify the exact problem. For example, if there 
were difficulties accessing information, it may have been because there was a software bug, or because the user 
training was insufficient, or because the EFB design was problematic. Here the EFB issue was classified more 
generally, to acknowledge that the underlying issue may not be well understood. 
Another subjective aspect of the analysis was in determining the list of relevant EFB issues. The final list 
presented here was constructed iteratively; where there were enough similar cases, the issue was called out on its 
own, but if the events were relatively unique, they were placed in a “Miscellaneous EFB Operation” category. 
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Results and Discussion 
Thirty-seven relevant reports were identified from the ASRS database. Descriptive statistics about these 
events are presented first for the information copied directly from the ASRS reports. Next is a discussion of the 
incident interpretations and the EFB issues that were encountered. A brief description of the two accident reports 
from the NTSB involving EFBs is provided after a discussion of ASRS events. 
EFB-Related ASRS Events  
Relatively few EFB-related ASRS reports were filed each year from 1995 through 2005 (zero to five events 
each year) but many more reports, 13 of the 37, were filed in 2006. The increased number of reports in 2006 may 
reflect the fact that EFBs were implemented more widely in the recent past. All types of operators are represented in 
the reports, but air carriers were involved in a relatively low proportion of the reports, just nine of the 37. More 
recent reports are largely from corporate operators. This may reflect the fact that while a small number of air carriers 
have been using EFBs for many years recent purchases have largely been from corporate operators. Weather and 
ambient lighting conditions do not appear to play a part in EFB-related safety reports. Most of the events (33) 
occurred in visual flight conditions. Reports were filed for both day (24) and night (8) conditions. 
Eighteen of the 37 events occurred on departure. Twelve of these occurred during initial climb out, an 
especially busy time in the flight. Three events that occurred preflight (on the ground) were related to errors in 
computing weight and balance or flight performance and in two events the problem was an expired database.  
Many pilots reported problems using the charts during the approach phase. The charting application was in 
use for 28 of the 37 reports. Note that the more recent reports tend to be related to the charts application, while older 
reports tend to be related to the flight performance calculations function. This also reflects the market trend that 
corporate operators, who purchased EFBs more recently, use them primarily for the charting function, while air 
carrier users, who purchased EFBs some time ago, use them primarily for flight calculations. 
Four of the reports were filed for events that occurred while flying the same location and procedure, 
specifically, the Teterboro, New Jersey (TEB) departure procedure known as the TEB 5 departure. This procedure 
provides separation between departures from Teterboro and arrivals into Newark International Airport, which serves 
the New York and New Jersey metropolitan area. The TEB 5 departure is a complex procedure that imposes a high 
level of workload regardless of whether an EFB is used or not because there is little margin for pilot error (see 
NASA, 2007 and FAA, 2008b). We cannot determine whether the use of an EFB is an additional risk factor under 
these high workload conditions without more information than is available in the ASRS report. 
Table 2 below provides a summary of the outcomes, and information about whether the EFB was a primary 
or contributing factor in the event. The most common outcome or anomaly was a deviation in track, heading, or 
speed; these occurred in 22 of the reports. A runway incursion occurred in four reports. However, the EFB was only 
a contributing factor, not the primary factor that caused the runway incursion in these four events. Other outcomes 
included incorrect weight and balance computations in three reports, use of expired databases, altitude confusion, 
deviation from a company policy, an aborted takeoff, and a tail strike upon rotation. 
  
Table 2. Outcomes and whether the EFB was a primary or contributing factor. 
Outcome Total EFB Primary Factor EFB Contributing Factor 
Spatial Deviation 22 12 10 
Runway Incursion 4 — 4 
Incorrect weight and balance computation 3 2 1 
Expired database 2 2 — 
Altitude confusion without violation 2 — 2 
Deviation from company policy 1 — 1 
Aborted takeoff 1 1 — 
Incorrect take-off speed, tail strike on rotation 1 1 — 
Altitude deviation during declared emergency 1 — 1 




The EFB was judged by the authors to be the primary cause for outcome in roughly half of the cases (18), 
and a contributing cause in the other half (19). Other factors for the outcomes in these reports included time 
pressure, fatigue, problems with the Flight Management Computer, and last minute changes to the aircraft clearance. 
Sometimes when the EFB was found to be a primary cause for the outcome, these other factors were also present as 
contributing causes. When the EFB was determined to be a contributing factor for the outcome, one of these other 
factors was typically the primary factor. 
The EFB issues encountered in these reports are summarized in Table 3 below, along with examples and a 
list of related sections from Chandra, Yeh, Riley, and Mangold (2003), which is a primary resource document about 
EFB human factors considerations for the FAA and industry. Although Chandra et al. (2003) contains material that 
is related to the issues seen in the ASRS reports, that report does not necessarily address the specific situations that 
occurred. The purpose of the reference to Chandra et al. in Table 3 is to identify sections that could be updated by 
incorporating the issues encountered in the ASRS reports as examples. In particular, some of the EFB-related 
incidents cut across issues in Chandra et al. and the links between these topics could be illustrated more clearly. 
Note that the number of issues reported in Table 3 is greater than the total number of reports because more than one 
EFB issue was encountered in some of the reports. 
Table 3. EFB issues encountered, examples, and related references. 
Issue Description Cases 
Related Section(s) from  
Chandra, et al. (2003) 
Display 
Configuration 
Related to zooming and panning to 
configure the display for readability. 
Information may be missed because 
it is out of view, or workload may be 
increased because of the task of 
configuring the display. 
14 
2.1.1 Workload 
6.2.5 Zooming and Panning 
6.2.11 De-cluttering and Display 
Configuration 
New to EFB The EFB is new to the crew. 
10 
2.1.1 Workload 




EFB is difficult to use for a variety of 
reasons (e.g., stowed away, 
sluggish response in cold 




2.2.3 Use of Unsecured EFB Systems 
2.5.3 Display 
Screen Legibility Screen is hard to use under different 
lighting conditions. 5 2.1.5 Lighting-Legibility 
EFB Inoperative EFB or application is not available 
for use (e.g., EFB in sleep mode or 
rebooting). 
3 2.4.5 Multitasking 2.4.9 Display of System Status 
Chart Selection Difficulty in selecting the required 
chart at the appropriate time (e.g., 
due to distraction, or turbulence). 
3 6.2.6 Chart procedures  6.2.9 Access to Individual Charts 
Software bug Failure of the software to operate as 
expected. 3 No applicable section. 
Flight Deck 
Procedures 
Related to crew procedures for using 
the EFB(s) (e.g., sharing/cross-
checking information). 
2 2.3.1 Part 121, Part 125, and Part 135 Operations EFB Policy 
Database Expired Issue in maintenance or crew 
verification of database currency. 2 
2.4.15 Ensuring Integrity of EFB Data 
2.4.16 Updating EFB Data 
Separated 
Information 
Difficulty of accessing related 
information 2 2.4.18 Links to Related Material 
Data entry Difficulty with data entry function. 
2 
5.1.1 Default Values 
5.1.2 Data-entry Screening and Error 
Messages 
 
The EFB issue encountered most often in this set of ASRS reports was related to zooming and display 
configuration of electronic charts. In order to read detailed information on the chart the pilot has to zoom in, but in 
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several events this resulted in the pilot missing important information that was off the screen. If the display is not 
zoomed in, small text can be misread. In addition, the display configuration tasks of zooming and scrolling create 
workload, and this workload contributed to pilot errors in some cases. One interesting comment from many of the 
reports was that the pilots would have preferred to have paper printouts of the charts for use during approaches and 
departures. Paper printouts at these times may be especially useful because hand-held EFBs must be stowed for 
safety during landing and takeoff (FAA, 2003). 
The second most common EFB issue was that, in ten of the reports, pilots indicated that the EFB was a new 
device for them. This appeared to be a factor in the level of workload and pilot performance. Interestingly, of these 
ten reports, one was from a Part 121 carrier (from 1999) and one was from a chartered Part 121 flight (in 2007). All 
of the others were Part 91 or 135, either corporate, private, or charter flights. AC 120-76A (FAA, 2003) requires 
Part 121 operators to be trained on EFBs, but it does not apply to Part 91 operators. Requirements for Part 91 
operators are more lenient (FAA, 2007) and they probably receive less training on EFBs than the Part 121 crews. 
NTSB Accident Reports Involving EFBs 
On July 31, 1997, a Federal Express (FedEx) MD-11 aircraft crashed while landing late at night in visual 
conditions at Newark International Airport in Newark, New Jersey (NTSB, 2000). Two crew members and three 
passengers escaped with minor injuries, but the aircraft was a total loss valued at $112 million. On December 8, 
2005, Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight arriving from Baltimore ran off the departure end of runway 31C at Chicago 
Midway International Airport in Chicago, Illinois at nighttime in instrument meteorological conditions (NTSB, 
2007). The Boeing 737-700 aircraft rolled through two fences and onto an adjacent roadway where it struck an 
automobile before coming to a stop. A child in the automobile was killed, and there were injured passengers both in 
the automobile and airplane. 
The EFB was a contributing, not a primary, factor in both these events. Both accidents involved use of the 
EFB to calculate landing distance. The EFBs had been in use for some time at both SWA and FedEx and the 
accident crews were experienced with their use and related procedures.  
In the FedEx accident, the NTSB found that the crew misinterpreted landing distances provided by the EFB 
such that they developed an unnecessary sense of urgency to touch down early and initiate maximum braking 
immediately. If the crew had correctly interpreted the EFB data, they would have known that there was actually an 
additional 900-ft stopping margin in the calculation. In response to NTSB recommendations from this accident, the 
FAA issued Flight Standards Information Bulletin for Air Transportation 02-03, which has since been updated to the 
InFO Safety Bulletin 0831 (FAA, 2008a). The bulletin reminds inspectors to review and ensure adequacy of training 
and procedures regarding use of EFB and interpretation of the data generated, including landing distance data. 
In the SWA accident, the programming and design of the Onboard Performance Computer (OPC) was a 
factor. The OPC did not show two inherent assumptions that were critical to the pilot’s decision to land. First, the 
pilots assumed that landing distance calculations were based on the value they entered for the tailwind component 
(8-knot), but the software actually showed landing distance based on a 5-knot limit for poor runway conditions 
allowed by company policy. The software highlighted the entered (8-knot) tailwind component on the display 
without indicating that the stopping margin was not based on that entry. Second, the OPC calculations incorporated 
the use of reverse thrust for this model of aircraft, but not for two other models that the pilots flew interchangeably. 
The pilots of the accident aircraft believed that the stopping margins they were shown were conservative because 
they thought that the reverse thrust was not entered into the calculations, but in fact, there was no such margin. The 
airline’s guidance to pilots on these differences has since been clarified. 
The NTSB report on the SWA accident correctly points out that guidance in Chandra et al. (2003) states only 
that the output of the performance calculations should be displayed in a manner that is understood easily and 
accurately, and that users of the EFB should be aware of an assumptions upon which the flight performance 
calculations are based (Section 5.1.6 Use of Performance Calculation Output, Chandra et al, 2003). The NTSB 
report provides specific suggestions for expanding these recommendations to ensure that critical assumptions are 
presented as clearly on the EFB as they are on paper (NTSB, 2007, pp. 48-49).  
Summary and Conclusions 
In this review, 37 incident reports related to use of EFBs were identified from the online ASRS database. 
Two NTSB accident reports involving EFBs were also identified. Descriptive statistics were computed for the ASRS 
events, and the authors reviewed the events in order to understand the EFB issues that were encountered. The most 
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common EFB issue encountered in the ASRS events was related to display configuration for using electronic charts. 
Another important issue appears to be related to the introduction of the EFB to new users. The two NTSB reports 
cite the EFB as a contributing factor in accidents where landing distance calculations were a factor, even though 
crews were experienced with the EFB. The reports emphasize the need for proper design of the flight performance 
calculation software for EFBs, and proper review of crew training and procedures for the use of the EFB.  
The results of this research can be used by regulatory authorities such as the FAA to update human factors 
guidance for evaluating and approving EFBs (e.g., Chandra, et al. 2003). In addition, these results can be used by 
EFB operators to anticipate issues that need special consideration. EFB manufacturers and designers may also find 
this report informative. 
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